https://wiki.das-labor.org/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=62.143.129.175&feedformat=atomLaborWiki - Benutzerbeiträge [de]2024-03-29T10:35:45ZBenutzerbeiträgeMediaWiki 1.39.6https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/Towards_Open_Trusted_Computing_Platforms&diff=2746Veranstaltung/Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms2005-12-05T10:07:43Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Facts */</p>
<hr />
<div>==Facts==<br />
* Wann: Do. 08.12.2005<br />
* Wer: Christian Stüble<br />
* Wo: LABOR<br />
<br />
==Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms==<br />
<br />
Experiences of the past have shown that common computing platforms<br />
lack security due to architectural problems and complexity. In this<br />
context, Trusted Computing (TC) is announced to be the basis for <br />
next-generation computing platforms, and claimed to improve users'<br />
security. However, people are concerned about those capabilities of<br />
TC that may allow content providers to gain too much power and<br />
control over the use of digital content and users' private information.<br />
<br />
In this talk, we argue that TC can increase the security of computing <br />
platforms by faithfully designing the operating system. Moreover, we discuss <br />
how interferences between digital rights management capabilities and end-user <br />
security can be prevented. Our results are based on the fact that even with <br />
TC platforms the operating system has enough control over the platform to <br />
prevent misuse by both content providers and end-users.<br />
<br />
We argue that such a trustworthy operating system that is secure in<br />
the sense of multilateral security can be developed without much<br />
effort by efficiently combining the ideas of security kernels and<br />
state of the art of operating system technology. We propose a new<br />
architecture for a trustworthy security platform that uses TC<br />
hardware features in conjunction with an open-source security kernel<br />
we have developed. Our security kernel provides<br />
backward-compatibility to the Linux operating system. The layered<br />
design and its lightweightness allows an easy migration to other<br />
hardware platforms like PDAs, mobile phones, and embedded systems.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/Towards_Open_Trusted_Computing_Platforms&diff=2745Veranstaltung/Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms2005-12-05T09:57:26Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Title: Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms */</p>
<hr />
<div>==Facts==<br />
* Wann: Do. 08.12.2005<br />
* Wer: Christian Stueple<br />
* Wo: LABOR<br />
<br />
==Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms==<br />
<br />
Experiences of the past have shown that common computing platforms<br />
lack security due to architectural problems and complexity. In this<br />
context, Trusted Computing (TC) is announced to be the basis for <br />
next-generation computing platforms, and claimed to improve users'<br />
security. However, people are concerned about those capabilities of<br />
TC that may allow content providers to gain too much power and<br />
control over the use of digital content and users' private information.<br />
<br />
In this talk, we argue that TC can increase the security of computing <br />
platforms by faithfully designing the operating system. Moreover, we discuss <br />
how interferences between digital rights management capabilities and end-user <br />
security can be prevented. Our results are based on the fact that even with <br />
TC platforms the operating system has enough control over the platform to <br />
prevent misuse by both content providers and end-users.<br />
<br />
We argue that such a trustworthy operating system that is secure in<br />
the sense of multilateral security can be developed without much<br />
effort by efficiently combining the ideas of security kernels and<br />
state of the art of operating system technology. We propose a new<br />
architecture for a trustworthy security platform that uses TC<br />
hardware features in conjunction with an open-source security kernel<br />
we have developed. Our security kernel provides<br />
backward-compatibility to the Linux operating system. The layered<br />
design and its lightweightness allows an easy migration to other<br />
hardware platforms like PDAs, mobile phones, and embedded systems.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/Towards_Open_Trusted_Computing_Platforms&diff=2744Veranstaltung/Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms2005-12-05T09:57:03Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Facts */</p>
<hr />
<div>==Facts==<br />
* Wann: Do. 08.12.2005<br />
* Wer: Christian Stueple<br />
* Wo: LABOR<br />
<br />
==Title: Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms==<br />
<br />
Experiences of the past have shown that common computing platforms<br />
lack security due to architectural problems and complexity. In this<br />
context, Trusted Computing (TC) is announced to be the basis for <br />
next-generation computing platforms, and claimed to improve users'<br />
security. However, people are concerned about those capabilities of<br />
TC that may allow content providers to gain too much power and<br />
control over the use of digital content and users' private information.<br />
<br />
In this talk, we argue that TC can increase the security of computing <br />
platforms by faithfully designing the operating system. Moreover, we discuss <br />
how interferences between digital rights management capabilities and end-user <br />
security can be prevented. Our results are based on the fact that even with <br />
TC platforms the operating system has enough control over the platform to <br />
prevent misuse by both content providers and end-users.<br />
<br />
We argue that such a trustworthy operating system that is secure in<br />
the sense of multilateral security can be developed without much<br />
effort by efficiently combining the ideas of security kernels and<br />
state of the art of operating system technology. We propose a new<br />
architecture for a trustworthy security platform that uses TC<br />
hardware features in conjunction with an open-source security kernel<br />
we have developed. Our security kernel provides<br />
backward-compatibility to the Linux operating system. The layered<br />
design and its lightweightness allows an easy migration to other<br />
hardware platforms like PDAs, mobile phones, and embedded systems.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/Towards_Open_Trusted_Computing_Platforms&diff=2743Veranstaltung/Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms2005-12-05T09:56:46Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Facts */</p>
<hr />
<div>==Facts==<br />
* Wann: Do. 08.12.2005<br />
* Wer: Christian Stueple<br />
* Wo: LABOR<br />
<br />
Title: Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms<br />
<br />
Experiences of the past have shown that common computing platforms<br />
lack security due to architectural problems and complexity. In this<br />
context, Trusted Computing (TC) is announced to be the basis for <br />
next-generation computing platforms, and claimed to improve users'<br />
security. However, people are concerned about those capabilities of<br />
TC that may allow content providers to gain too much power and<br />
control over the use of digital content and users' private information.<br />
<br />
In this talk, we argue that TC can increase the security of computing <br />
platforms by faithfully designing the operating system. Moreover, we discuss <br />
how interferences between digital rights management capabilities and end-user <br />
security can be prevented. Our results are based on the fact that even with <br />
TC platforms the operating system has enough control over the platform to <br />
prevent misuse by both content providers and end-users.<br />
<br />
We argue that such a trustworthy operating system that is secure in<br />
the sense of multilateral security can be developed without much<br />
effort by efficiently combining the ideas of security kernels and<br />
state of the art of operating system technology. We propose a new<br />
architecture for a trustworthy security platform that uses TC<br />
hardware features in conjunction with an open-source security kernel<br />
we have developed. Our security kernel provides<br />
backward-compatibility to the Linux operating system. The layered<br />
design and its lightweightness allows an easy migration to other<br />
hardware platforms like PDAs, mobile phones, and embedded systems.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/Towards_Open_Trusted_Computing_Platforms&diff=2742Veranstaltung/Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms2005-12-05T09:56:00Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Teaser */</p>
<hr />
<div>==Facts==<br />
* Wann:<br />
* Wer:<br />
* Wo:<br />
<br />
Title: Towards Open Trusted Computing Platforms<br />
<br />
Experiences of the past have shown that common computing platforms<br />
lack security due to architectural problems and complexity. In this<br />
context, Trusted Computing (TC) is announced to be the basis for <br />
next-generation computing platforms, and claimed to improve users'<br />
security. However, people are concerned about those capabilities of<br />
TC that may allow content providers to gain too much power and<br />
control over the use of digital content and users' private information.<br />
<br />
In this talk, we argue that TC can increase the security of computing <br />
platforms by faithfully designing the operating system. Moreover, we discuss <br />
how interferences between digital rights management capabilities and end-user <br />
security can be prevented. Our results are based on the fact that even with <br />
TC platforms the operating system has enough control over the platform to <br />
prevent misuse by both content providers and end-users.<br />
<br />
We argue that such a trustworthy operating system that is secure in<br />
the sense of multilateral security can be developed without much<br />
effort by efficiently combining the ideas of security kernels and<br />
state of the art of operating system technology. We propose a new<br />
architecture for a trustworthy security platform that uses TC<br />
hardware features in conjunction with an open-source security kernel<br />
we have developed. Our security kernel provides<br />
backward-compatibility to the Linux operating system. The layered<br />
design and its lightweightness allows an easy migration to other<br />
hardware platforms like PDAs, mobile phones, and embedded systems.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltungsreihe/Open_Meeting&diff=2726Veranstaltungsreihe/Open Meeting2005-12-01T21:42:45Z<p>62.143.129.175: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Offenes Treffen im LABOR'''<br />
<br />
Im Gegensatz zum Bootstrap-Meeting, das zumindest konzeptionell eher einen organisatorischen Schwerpunkt hat, ist das offene Treffen einfach nur Treffen. Zum reden, basteln und um das LABOR, die Leute, sowie die Getränkeauswahl kennenzulernen.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltungsreihe/Open_Meeting&diff=2725Veranstaltungsreihe/Open Meeting2005-12-01T21:36:40Z<p>62.143.129.175: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Offenes Treffen im LABOR'''<br />
<br />
Im Gegensatz zum Bootstrap-Meeting, das zumindest konzeptionell eher einen organisatorischen Schwerpunkt hat, ist das offene Treffen einfach nur Treffen. Zum reden, basteln und das LABOR, die Leute, sowie die Getränkeauswahl kennenzulernen.</div>62.143.129.175https://wiki.das-labor.org/index.php?title=Veranstaltung/openMosix&diff=2722Veranstaltung/openMosix2005-12-01T21:21:30Z<p>62.143.129.175: /* Facts */</p>
<hr />
<div>== Facts ==<br />
<br />
* Was: '''High Performance Computing mit openMosix - eine Einführung'''<br />
* Wann: 15.12.2005<br />
* Wer: TiL<br />
<br />
== Teaser ==<br />
<br />
openMosix bietet eine einfache Möglichkeit des Clusterings unter Linux. Warum das toll ist, was man damit machen kann und was besser nicht, darauf soll der Vortrag erste Antworten geben.<br />
<br />
Nach einer kurzen Einführung in die Welt der Cluster geht es um openMosix selbst. Warum gibt es das System, warum benutzen nicht alle Menschen Beowulf, was sind die Vorteile von openMosix und wo gibt es Einschränkungen, weshalb also benutzen nicht alle Menschen openMosix.<br />
<br />
Das Ganze bewegt sich im Rahmen der FlashMeetings-Reihe und ist dementsprechend ein Kurzvortrag - 25 bis 45 Minuten.<br />
[[Kategorie:Veranstaltungen]]</div>62.143.129.175